The goal of these discussions and reviews can help us all learn from this accident and help prevent future occurrences. I applaud Eric in his open aspersion of wanting to learn and improve procedures going forward.
Perhaps a buddy system, where most things are done and checked would have prevented this accident but I’m not convinced this is the case. The cause was very simple and is being misdirected or overlooked in this conversation.
History of events as I saw them:
• At the beginning of this trip a safety meeting was held while programs were outlined.
• On this particular day, I and several others passed directly under Andy just prior to this event, we said hello and left him resting comfortably in his hammock.
• A short time after, I was standing in front of the lodge with Mark and others when a local resident approached speaking in Spanish that one of our climbers had cut himself and was bleeding. Others were notified and Mark and I immediately went to the last place we saw Andy.
• As we approached the area Karen came running to us and reported that Andy was hurt. Mark, being quick and nimble, arrived first and I “soon” after.
• Andy was laying in the sand near the base of the trunk of a large fig tree, just to the side of a large buttress and block of concrete.
• First thing he said to me was, “I thought I was tied in twice”. Andy also mentioned the Yosemite tie off used.
• My first concern with a 40’ fall was obvious spinal injury but mostly internal bleeding.
• I stayed with Karen and Andy while Mark ran to the lodge to get Malina, (a medical doctor and member of the group) and to notify others so that a rescue plan could be implemented.
• Malina and others arrived and James, one of the guides, facilitated the ground rescue activities. First aid was given and Andy was transported from the site to a medical facility.
Observations at the site.
• A cinched canopy anchor was set 60’ in the tree opposite the side used for the hammock and a throw line was attached for removal. The branch was large, approximately 8 inches in diameter.
• At about 40’ hanging in the tree below the primary cinched canopy anchor near the trunk was a cambium saver with an autoblock friction hitch, carabiner and foot loop. The cambium saver was resting on top of the friction hitch. The hitch, carabiner and foot loop were configured for an SRT ascent.
• The tail or other end of the climbing line was next to the trunk, the end about a foot above the ground, with a bowline tied with a very small eye and a short tail was hanging below and pointing downward.
• An approximate 2’ long cambium saver was on this end of the climbing line and located above the bowline which was about a foot off the ground.
• Andy was on the ground on the other side of a large buttress to the dangling climbing line.
• Several substantial limbs were below the suspended friction hitch and carabiner and on the same side of the tree with the climbing line.
Speculation on my part:
• Andy made an SRT ascent to about 40’ using an autoblock friction hitch and foot loop.
• Upon reaching this 40’ point he then used the tail of his 60’ climbing line to set a DdRT line to assist in placing his hammock. (Another autoblock hitch, cambium saver, a bowline with Yosemite tie off were used to attach the working end to a rock climbing type lightweight harness.)
• Possibly when he lifted the other end of his system up into the tree, the bowline and Yosemite tie-off became misconfigured. At this point when Andy clipped into the DdRT system he may have inadvertently connected to the small loop of the Yosemite tie-off and not the loop of the bowline.
• The connection to the Yosemite tie-off could have passed a quick visual inspection and handled being weighted for a short time. Being that the loop of the bowline was so small it only took a little movement in the configuration of the knot to misidentify the tie-off for the actual bowline loop. (I have tested this and suspended my entire weight on the Yosemite tie-off.)
• Andy limb walked using the SRT and DdRT system to set the hammock. Once the hammock was set Andy disconnected the SRT system. After a period of time, Andy returned to the trunk using the DdRT system and limb walking.
• Feeling that he was securely attached after using the DdRT system, (after all he had been using it to set the hammock while the Yosemite loop was holding) he returned to the trunk to reconnect the SRT system for the descent. It was at this point, sitting into the system, the Yosemite tie-off let go with a pop, sending Andy falling to the ground. His descent was slowed by the rope running under his leg as the DdRT system cleared the secondary anchor. Several branches and perhaps Andy holding the now upside-down hitch that was still attached to his saddle and the climbing line also contributed to slowing his descent. In addition, the hitch and Andy finally contacted the top of the cambium saver, now about 3-4’ off the ground. At this point the stretch of the Fly climbing line also provided a little more slowing of the descent.
Some things that could have made a difference:
• I had brought for the group small hand held radios with a 35 mile line of sight range. Perhaps if Andy had one, Karen could have called those at the lodge and saved the 10 minute walks to communicate with others.
• If Andy had not disconnected from the SRT side of his system there may not have been a fall or at least it would have been minimalized.
• The obvious, a very thorough check of the knot. Even if fully weighted, (and it may have been) this Yosemite loop may have passed most, “weight the system” checks.
• Unlike a 3x3 prusik, an autoblock friction hitch (a variant of a Klemheist) is very one directional when in use. It must be reset and dressed to function in the opposite direction. In fact the autoblock is even worse as the carabiner will ride down the top of the inverted hitch making it nearly impossible to offer resistance. Had a 3x3 prusik been used on the standing part of the line, when the Yosemite tie off let go of the working end, the prusik would have stopped the descent.
This would be like setting up a 2:1 lanyard but I can’t think of a good reason to implement this type of friction hitch in a climbing system unless you were planning for the failure of the working end of your line.
In my opinion the thing that would have prevented this accident and has not yet been emphasized.
• Most importantly, I feel that if a cinching knot, such as a scaffold or anchor knot had been used at the termination or working end of the climbing line connecting the carabiner to the climbing harness, this failure would not have occurred. Even if the gate of the carabiner had been opened and stayed open and the strength of the carabiner weakened, the knot would have been in place. Or for example, if the gate became open while using an open configuration such as a Blakes hitch, the cinched knot would still be in place and would not have allowed the line to escape. I know that for professional arborists using ANSI standards a cinching knot to the carabiner or anchor on your saddle is required. I understand that recreational climbing is not bound by this standard but I find it interesting that this concept has not been fully adopted by recreational climbers.
Some things that may not have made a difference:
• Even if a buddy system was in use, I suspect that almost every climber would not have recognized that the carabiner was actually in the Yosemite loop rather than the bowline loop. I pointed this out in a video. I suspect that I could tie this very failed knot, show it to club members and pass a quick inspection.
• Climbing using a modified or very personalized system. Andy, I think the system you implemented, although very task specific, was and can be a safe system. I understand how it works and see the advantages of a lightweight harness, 60’ line and minimal hardware for a short climb to a hammock in a well-structured tree to rest and observe nature and get more of those fantastic pictures you take. I think different friction hitches, a cinching anchor at your harness and perhaps a fig 8 for the descent could be an improvement.
Point is, what you were doing was not dangerous or reckless.
My thoughts and a few observations:
We all know how fortunate Andy was. The actual errors that caused this accident were very subtle and not a reflection on recklessness, lack of training, ill preparation of the guides or lack of monitoring or guidance. It was a well-planned trip designed for adults that are willing to take responsibility for their own actions but yet experience a world of nature, life, friendship and tree climbing.
• When I passed Andy I was with a group returning form a walk along the beach. I don’t remember it being a particular strenuous day as most of us were just enjoying the ocean.
• One concept I think that can lead to a safer group activity is to implement an open exchange and discussion of climbing -- something to keep everyone’s head in the game and to learn from one another. Each climber has the opportunity to teach something to the others, to demonstrate the system they use and particular techniques that they enjoy. Knots, equipment, systems and techniques could be reviewed. Perhaps in an open learning environment methods leading up to an accident such as this could have been prevented.
• Concerning the point of aerial rescue. If a shorter rope was used this accident also would not have happened and no aerial rescue would be needed. Andy would not have been able to reach the climbing line in the first place. Andy had a single, un-obstructed line to the ground for self-rescue. Also a 40’ climb with a 60’ anchor was an easy reach for many climbers in attendance.
• Termination knots as mentioned can impede the function of the friction hitch on a DdRT system. You can avoid this by using spliced tight eyes, or large eyes with banding or tying a suitable termination knot with a large eye and a cinching girth hitch or clove hitch. These solutions provide a good cinching type anchor to your saddle connection. Focus on the termination knot and use of a cinching anchor would have prevented this accident.
• In regards to a safety knot below the hitch of this failed DdRT system. It would simply be a knot above the inverted and descending friction hitch if it were employed in this case and be of no use.
• In the climbing community there can be at times much criticism and defensiveness of systems and programs. Throughout all of this Eric has demonstrated that he is simply trying to understand this incident and to learn from it in order to prevent it from happening again.
Question: Andy, did you set that bowline (tail of your SRT line) with the cambium saver, friction hitch and carabiner in place while on the ground and then pull it up when needed? It would make sense to me then, how it could easily get re-oriented with the bowline bite going tight and leaving the Yosemite tie-off loop more visible.
Eric, you ran a great trip. Well planned programs with some of the normal travel hitches one would expect. The atmosphere was unstressed, climb oriented, and professional. Your leadership was soft spoken but effective. People were treated as adults and it was a fun and a great learning experience for all.
An unfortunate accident happened and could have been avoided but nothing in this thread has yet to address the real failure and how to correct it. In my opinion, it is the use of an effective cinching termination knot.
I think an open discussion, without implications, is most beneficial for all of us.